Historic jurisdiction ushers a new era for continental justice
By ruling on 26 June that it is competent to adjudicate Democratic Republic of Congo v. Rwanda, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights moved beyond its traditional remit of individual petitions. Justice Rafaa Ben Achour’s measured declaration—“the Court rejects the objection to jurisdiction”—signals an institutional maturation that many African legal scholars had long advocated. According to Dr. Solomon Dersso, former chair of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court has “stepped onto terrain it was ultimately designed to occupy, but had so far avoided” (Al Jazeera, 27 June). The stakes, therefore, now transcend the litigants and bear directly on the credibility of continental rule-of-law architecture.
A dossier steeped in allegations and denials
Kinshasa’s 2023 application accuses Kigali of facilitating war crimes—from forced displacement to extrajudicial killings—by providing covert support to the M23 rebellion. United Nations Group of Experts reports from August 2022 and July 2023 speak of “compelling evidence” of Rwandan troop presence on Congolese soil. Rwanda’s foreign minister, Vincent Biruta, counters that such claims are “politically motivated fabrications aimed at masking Kinshasa’s own governance failures” (Reuters, 14 March). The divergence underscores how human-rights vocabulary has become a proxy battlefield for neighbouring capitals seeking moral high ground in a conflict that has displaced more than 800,000 civilians, according to the International Organization for Migration.
Precedent and procedure: the Court’s tight-rope
The Arusha bench now confronts intricate procedural questions that will test its capacity. Neither Kigali nor Kinshasa has entered reservations excluding interstate litigation, yet only 10 of the 34 states that recognise the Court have ever submitted to its optional jurisdiction. Any perception of bias risks discouraging future referrals. Further complexity arises from the need to reconcile human-rights standards with jus ad bellum considerations; the Court must weigh alleged aggression against Rwanda’s own stated right of self-defence vis-à-vis hostile militias operating near its frontier. Dr. Awa N’Diaye, lecturer at Cheikh Anta Diop University, notes that “the Court’s ruling, whatever its direction, will inevitably contour doctrines of state responsibility for proxy warfare on the continent.”
Great Lakes security matrix and diplomatic aftershocks
Beyond legal theatres, regional chancelleries calculate ripple effects. Burundi and Uganda, themselves once parties to Congolese wars of the late 1990s, eye the process as a barometer for potential liability. The East African Community force—whose deployment in North Kivu began in late 2022—could face legitimacy questions should the Court affirm Rwanda’s involvement. A senior AU peace-and-security official, requesting anonymity, argues that a clear judicial finding may “either catalyse a negotiated withdrawal or entrench Kigali’s siege mentality, with immediate consequences for MONUSCO’s draw-down schedule.”
Minerals, markets and the silent arithmetic of war
The litigation coincides with record global demand for coltan, cobalt and 3T minerals extracted from eastern Congo. Transparency International’s 2024 brief warns that illicit cross-border smuggling funnels an estimated 400 million dollars annually to armed networks. Should the Court ultimately order reparations, the quantification of losses to civilian infrastructure and extractive revenue could exceed amounts awarded in the 2005 International Court of Justice ruling that condemned Uganda. Multinationals, already under mounting European Union due-diligence regulations, may have to reassess supply chains that transit through Rwandan refineries.
Arusha’s verdict as a litmus test for African multilateralism
The Court has given Kigali ninety days to file a counter-memorial, an interval during which quiet shuttle diplomacy is expected to intensify. South Africa and Angola, co-mediators in previous ceasefire efforts, are reportedly exploring out-of-court settlement possibilities, though officials in Kinshasa insist they “will not abjure judicial redress for expediency” (Radio Okapi, 30 June). Whatever the outcome, the case compels African states to confront a paradox long lamented by scholars: the continent’s normative frameworks are robust on paper yet seldom enforced. Should the bench articulate a persuasive, enforceable ruling, it will demonstrate that sovereignty need not preclude accountability, and that pan-African institutions can occupy a constitutional space once monopolised by The Hague.