An emerging axis between New Delhi and Kinshasa
The discreet arrival of multiple Indian delegations in Kinshasa since January has confirmed that New Delhi no longer sees the Democratic Republic of the Congo merely as a distant peacekeeping theatre. According to senior Congolese officers, at least three separate teams from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bharat Electronics and Tata Advanced Systems have presented product catalogues ranging from light utility helicopters to encrypted battlefield radios (Le Potentiel, 4 April 2024). The tempo of visits has been matched by sustained diplomatic contact: India’s ambassador to the DRC, Madan-Lal Raheja, held two rounds of talks with Defense Minister Gilbert Kabanda in March alone, framing the dialogue as part of a “South-South security partnership” designed to strengthen Congolese sovereignty.
While India has supplied limited quantities of non-lethal equipment to African partners for decades, the courtship of Kinshasa illustrates a shift from episodic sales to strategic engagement. New Delhi’s Ministry of External Affairs confirmed in a note verbale that defense trade now forms a “pillar” of its Africa programme, alongside traditional lines of credit for infrastructure (MEA briefing, 22 February 2024).
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Congolese procurement officials insist the overture did not emerge in a vacuum. The Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, overstretched by the resurgence of the M23 rebellion and persistent violence in Ituri, face pressing needs for air mobility, surveillance and protective gear. Domestic sources admit that Western suppliers have proven either prohibitively expensive or constrained by human-rights conditionalities. With Russian industry distracted by Ukraine and Chinese firms focusing on infrastructure rather than combat systems, Indian companies perceive what one executive from Larsen & Toubro describes as “a perfect storm of demand, vacuum and diplomatic goodwill” (Business Standard, 19 March 2024).
From the Indian vantage point, Central Africa offers a proving ground for equipment originally developed for counter-insurgency in Kashmir and the Northeast. HAL’s Dhruv helicopter, recently cleared for night missions after a series of upgrades, has been offered under a financing scheme backed by India’s Exim Bank. Mahindra Defence is marketing its Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, arguing that Congolese terrain and threat profiles mirror those encountered in India’s own internal security operations.
Congolese procurement priorities and the calculus of diversification
Kinshasa’s interest is not purely technical. Diversifying suppliers mitigates the risk of over-dependence and offers leverage in negotiations with legacy partners such as France and Belgium. A senior official in the presidency concedes that “India’s non-interference rhetoric and flexible financing are politically attractive at a time when the government faces Western scrutiny over electoral reforms” (Jeune Afrique, 7 April 2024).
Yet Congolese officers also emphasise performance. The Dhruv’s operational record with the Ecuadorian Air Force—marred by two crashes between 2009 and 2015—remains a cautionary tale, even after subsequent design corrections. To assuage doubts, HAL has proposed a three-year warranty and a Kinshasa-based maintenance hub that would train Congolese technicians while serving as a regional support centre.
Budgetary realities may determine the pace of acquisition. The DRC’s defence budget, officially pegged at 1.1 billion dollars for 2024, allocates less than 8 percent to capital expenditure. Delhi has therefore floated an offer combining concessional loans, buyers’ credit and settlement in partially convertible rupees, mirroring arrangements previously used in Mozambique.
The geopolitical backdrop: Russia’s retreat, China’s presence, India’s entry
India’s advance into Congolese defence space cannot be divorced from the broader strategic vacuum created by Moscow’s preoccupation with its Ukrainian campaign. The Russian arms industry, once a competitive supplier of budget equipment to Central Africa, faces delivery delays and tighter Western secondary sanctions. Meanwhile, Beijing’s posture remains ambivalent: Chinese firms such as NORINCO have supplied small arms and light armour, yet Beijing prioritises mining concessions over sustained security commitments, preferring the United Nations peacekeeping umbrella to do the heavy lifting in eastern DRC.
New Delhi is therefore positioning itself as an alternative security patron unburdened by neo-colonial tropes but capable of delivering affordable force multipliers. Analysts at the Observer Research Foundation argue that such moves serve India’s ambition to secure critical minerals—cobalt and coltan in particular—essential to its electric-vehicle ecosystem (ORF Issue Brief, March 2024). They also reinforce India’s claim to global-South leadership ahead of the 2025 Non-Aligned Movement summit, which Kampala is slated to host.
Human rights, transparency and the risk ledger
Critics warn that a purely transactional embrace risks sidelining accountability. Congolese civil-society groups recall past scandals involving opaque military contracts with Israeli and Ukrainian intermediaries, and fear a repeat if Delhi fails to enforce robust compliance standards. Amnesty International’s Central Africa office notes that “the lack of end-user monitoring mechanisms in India’s draft agreements could facilitate diversion to irregular armed groups” (Amnesty statement, 25 March 2024).
Indian officials counter that the Arms Trade Treaty, which New Delhi has signed but not yet ratified, already guides due-diligence procedures. They highlight India’s record as the single largest troop contributor to MONUSCO, suggesting that its officers understand the sensitivities of the Congolese theatre. Nevertheless, the absence of a parliamentary oversight framework for India’s overseas defence credit lines has attracted scrutiny from domestic watchdogs such as the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Prospects for a long-term Indo-Congolese security compact
Negotiators on both sides hint that the current dialogue could culminate in a comprehensive defence cooperation agreement by the close of 2024, encompassing joint training at the Indian Army’s Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School, technology transfer for small-arms ammunition, and periodic naval port calls in Matadi. Such an accord would elevate Kinshasa to the status New Delhi already reserves for Vietnam and Oman.
Whether the partnership matures depends on converging political calendars. President Félix Tshisekedi, re-elected in December 2023, seeks quick security dividends before provincial polls in 2025. India’s own election cycle enters a less heated phase after the summer of 2024, offering bureaucratic bandwidth to finalise credits. The most uncertain variable remains the battlefield: renewed escalation in North Kivu could either underscore the urgency of Indian hardware or render procurement moot if a regional intervention force alters the conflict dynamics.
For now, diplomats describe a relationship in cautious bloom. As one Congolese brigadier quipped after inspecting a Dhruv cockpit, “We have danced with many partners; perhaps it is time to try a new rhythm.” In the orchestrated world of defence diplomacy, India and Congo appear willing to test that choreography, one discreet rendezvous at a time.
